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THE ORGANIZATIONAL PREMISES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
WILLIAM H. SIMON 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The core doctrines of administrative law have not taken account of 
developments in the theory and practice of organization. The contours of these 
doctrines were set in the mid-twentieth century when the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) was passed. Although these doctrines have evolved since 
then, administration itself has changed more. Many of the widely perceived 
deficiencies of the doctrines, including some associated with overregulation and 
others with underregulation, seem influenced by an anachronistic 
understanding of organization. 
Much administrative law continues to understand public administration as 
bureaucracy. In particular, doctrine is strongly influenced by three premises. 
First, the backward-looking conception of legitimacy sees organization as 
instrumental to previously chosen values and goals. Authority thus depends on 
prior authorization. Second, there is the balance between fixed rules and 
unreviewable discretion. In the bureaucratic view, the rule is the most important 
type of norm. However, because rules are relatively inflexible and difficult to 
change, residual pockets of unaccountable discretion must be tolerated. And, 
third, is the reactive approach to error detection. Errors are understood to arise 
from idiosyncratic circumstances; they are addressed primarily through 
complaints, and complaints are understood to raise primarily issues of 
individual accuracy or fairness. 
The model of organization these premises express is associated in the 
private sector with mass manufacturing of standardized products as it 
developed in the early and mid-twentieth centuries. The ideas developed in 
manufacturing influenced public administration, especially the Progressive and 
New Deal regulatory and social welfare programs.  The designers of the APA 
were responding to these programs. This model was once the dominant 
paradigm of efficient large-scale organization, but it now competes with, and in 
some quarters has been displaced by, another one.  This newer, 
postbureaucratic or performance-based approach has emerged in the private 
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sector as industries have sought flexibility to adapt to more volatile economic 
circumstances and to the demand for more differentiated products. As 
reformers have recognized an analogous need for government to respond to 
fluidity and diversity, they have imported elements of the postbureaucratic view 
to the public sector. 
In postbureaucratic organization, legitimacy depends less on prior 
authorization than on transparency and consequent openness to ongoing diffuse 
democratic pressures. The key type of norm is not the rule but the plan. Plans 
are more comprehensive than rules, and although plans may contain rules, as 
norms, they are more provisional and less categorically prescriptive than 
bureaucratic rules. Plans typically set out procedures for monitoring their own 
implementation and for frequent reassessment in light of information derived 
from monitoring. Whereas change in bureaucracy tends to be episodic, change 
in postbureaucratic organization tends to be continuous. Although they do not 
regulate as tightly as rules, plans do not create pockets of unaccountable 
discretion. Departures from a plan may be permissible, but they typically trigger 
review and require explanation. Finally, postbureaucratic organization takes a 
proactive approach to error detection: It tends to rely on audits more than 
complaints, and it takes a diagnostic approach to complaints, understanding 
them not just as evidence of idiosyncratic deviance, but as symptoms of systemic 
malfunction. 
Part II of this article argues that administrative law doctrine reflects the 
older view of organization (1) in its often-obsessive preoccupation with 
statutory authorization and its relative indifference to transparency; (2) in 
treating rules and rulemaking as rigid constraints on administrative action in 
some spheres while tolerating wide unreviewable discretion in others; and (3) in 
understanding adjudication as a series of independent responses to idiosyncratic 
errors. This orientation fits poorly with regulatory and welfare initiatives that 
are premised on a different understanding of organization. In consequence, 
efforts to achieve administrative accountability are often heavy-handed or 
ineffectual or both. 
The gravity of this charge depends on how we define “administrative law.” 
As I have used it so far, the term denotes the text and judicial interpretations of 
the APA and associated constitutional doctrine on delegation and procedural 
due process. This doctrine is largely concerned with the role of the courts (1) in 
policing administrative rulemaking and formal adjudication and (2) in enforcing 
agency compliance with statutes and their own rules. The doctrine—which I call 
“canonical” administrative law—occupies the largest and most prominent 
positions in treatises and the casebooks. It coexists with other doctrines, but it is 
more integrally and densely elaborated than the others, and it is the doctrine 
academics find easiest to teach and test. This is the doctrine that part II argues 
is out of touch with performance-based organization.1 
 
 1.  David Zaring refers to what I call canonical doctrine as “administrative law conventionally 
understood.” He finds that it “misses a great swath of actual administration, in addition to what lawyers 
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However, the canonical doctrine represents only a small and, in some 
respects, arbitrary subset of the universe of law governing public administrative 
practice. Noncanonical elements of this broader universe strongly reflect the 
performance-based view. The anachronistic character of conventional doctrine 
is partly a function of the way in which the canon has been defined. 
Part III demonstrates the emergence of performance-based organization in 
three bodies of doctrine that are typically ignored in accounts of administrative 
law, even though they are centrally concerned with administration. The first is a 
set of statutory directives concerned with administrative transparency, planning, 
and proactive error detection. A second body of noncanonical administrative 
law consists of initiatives through which the White House or agencies have used 
discretion to move agency practice in a performance-based direction. Finally, a 
third source of noncanonical authority has been developed by the courts in 
institutional-reform litigation—civil rights actions seeking to restructure public 
agencies or programs. As developed by the lower courts in recent decades, this 
doctrine is predominantly influenced by postbureaucratic conceptions of 
organization. 
The interventions I characterize as performance-based span a range of 
structures. Some are relatively hierarchical, focused on static efficiency, and 
driven by individual choice or market mechanisms in a manner that has been 
characterized as “minimalist.” Others are relatively decentralized, focused on 
learning, and driven by deliberative mechanisms in a manner that has been 
called “experimentalist.” However, all converge in their rejection of core 
assumptions about organization made in canonical administrative law.2 
Part IV concludes that canonical administrative law suffers in two broad 
respects from its inattention to performance-based organization. First, 
descriptively, the canon gives an arbitrarily truncated picture of the role of law 
in the administrative state. Second, normatively, its interventions are often 
poorly designed for the central task on which it focuses—judicial control of 
administrative action. 
II 
CANONICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION 
Canonical administrative law consists of the text and judicial elaboration of 
the APA and the related constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and 
 
do to affect it.” David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 236 (2010). My 
argument supports this claim and suggests some of the reasons for the gap between doctrine and 
practice. 
 2.  See generally Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). See also Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-
Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC. REV. 691 
(2003) (describing the supersession of command-and-control by regimes focused on output monitoring 
in some fields and on customized planning in others). Although Coglianese and Lazer use the term 
“performance-based” only in connection with output-monitoring, the term as used in this article 
includes both approaches.  
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procedural due process. Its most prominent concerns are the role of courts 
when reviewing administrative action and the procedural requirements of 
administrative rulemaking and adjudication. This authority can be demanding, 
but measured in relation to the range of administrative activity, it is quite 
narrow. It does not reach some of the most practically important official 
conduct. 
Some of the most dysfunctional features of canonical doctrine—both the 
excessively burdensome ones and the excessively lax ones—are associated with 
its highly limited and increasingly anachronistic conception of public 
administration. This conception is reflected in the key themes of (1) the 
backward-looking conception of legitimacy; (2) the need to choose between 
fixed rules and unreviewable discretion; and (3) the reactive approach to error 
detection. 
A. The Backward-Looking Conception of Legitimacy 
The canonical authority tends to assume that the legitimacy of 
administrative action depends most fundamentally on prior authorization. In a 
democracy, the people are sovereign, but their only standard form of 
participation is voting in general elections. They choose representatives who 
make decisions on their behalf by enacting statutes. Although legislation is one 
step removed from the electoral decisions of the people, it carries the legitimacy 
of electoral warrant. Administrative action, on the other hand, is more than one 
step removed. As a result, its legitimacy depends on the ability to find some 
warrant in the steps closer to the electoral process. Most often, the quest is for 
some mandate in the decisions of the legislature. The President is an elected 
official, too, and presidential authorization may sometimes be adequate or 
necessary, but the dominant separation-of-powers conceptions most often make 
legislative authorization critical. Either way, we are dealing with what Fritz 
Scharpf calls “input legitimacy.”3 
The backward-looking conception can be contrasted to a view that sees 
democratic legitimacy in terms of oversight. Legislators define goals and set a 
framework for administration, but administrators are expected to pursue the 
goals in ways that the legislators cannot foresee. Thus, in addition to 
authorizing executive conduct in advance, the legislature also monitors and 
responds to such conduct after the fact. It can respond through both revision of 
authority and reallocation of resources. Similarly, electoral candidates take 
positions based on retrospective evaluations of administrative performance, and 
voters’ electoral choices take implicit positions on such evaluations. 
Authorization gives administrative action input legitimacy, but when Congress 
or the electorate approves administrative action retrospectively, it recognizes 
“output” legitimacy. In the oversight perspective, the most central institutional 
concern is transparency. Transparency tends both to improve the quality of 
 
 3.  FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE OR DEMOCRATIC? 6–10 (1999).  
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decisions and to facilitate accountability. It enables the legislature and the 
electorate to reverse or restrict decisions of which they disapprove. And it 
subjects administrators to the informal pressures of shame and pride that may 
contribute further to the alignment of practice with legislative and popular will. 
Canonical administrative law is heavily preoccupied with prior 
authorization. It occasionally invokes oversight values, but, just as often, it is 
indifferent to or disdainful of them. To begin, the nondelegation doctrine—the 
usual starting point of treatises and courses on administrative law—purports to 
constitutionalize the principle of prior authorization by requiring a threshold of 
legislative specification. Because the courts have not been able to specify a 
threshold that would impose any practical limit on contemporary legislative 
activity, the doctrine has no direct effect as constitutional constraint, but it 
looms over the field as both forlorn hope and noble aspiration. 
At the same time that the nondelegation doctrine exalts prior authorization, 
it rejects any role for values associated with oversight. For decades, commenters 
suggested that deficiency in legislative specification might be mitigated by 
administrative self-discipline through rulemaking.4 Specification at the agency 
level would not amplify the connection to prior legislative acts, but it would 
make current practice more transparent and hence more open to ongoing 
appraisal. Yet, when an intermediate court pursued this suggestion, the 
nondelegation proponents on the Supreme Court emphatically rebuffed it, 
denying that nondelegation constraints entailed or could be satisfied by 
postenactment specification.5 At the moment, the doctrine stands solely for 
backward-looking accountability, but without imposing any practical constraints 
that might further it. 
These backward-looking concerns are evident in the textualist or formalist 
approaches that urge narrow interpretation of statutes. A basic argument of 
textualist or formalist proponents is that the farther judicial decisions depart 
from statutory text, the less confident we can be that those decisions have been 
authorized by the legislature. Courts must have authority to elaborate law, but 
the argument asserts that some consequences—notably, those that depart from 
traditional common law norms or that threaten constitutional protections—
should only be imposed by the legislature. Refusing to construe ambiguous 
statutes to impose novel consequences is a way of protecting baseline common 
law or constitutional values from casual or unreflective impingement. There is 
wide disagreement over textualist methodology and over the domain in which it 
should be applied, but it is influential.6 
 
 4.  See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 1–25 
(1971). 
 5.  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The idea that an agency can cure 
an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power 
seems to us internally contradictory.”). 
 6.  E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 140–42 (1958) (applying strict construction to protect civil 
liberties); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–45 (1983) (urging strict 
statutory construction to protect common law values). 
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When the courts take a limited view of their functions under canonical 
administrative law, they frequently invoke backward-looking legitimacy. The 
most capacious and frequently invoked provision of the APA section on “scope 
of review” authorizes courts to set aside agency actions found to be “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”7 
Viewing the text alone, one might think that there are many ways that 
administrative action could be unlawfully arbitrary, capricious, or abusive other 
than by departing from legislative enactment. One might view the broad 
language as, in part, a mandate for the courts to develop a common law of 
administrative practice—or rather, to resume doing so, since prior to the APA, 
a large fraction of administrative law consisted of judge-made subconstitutional 
norms.8 Often, however, the courts limit their role to ensuring that 
administrative action conforms to legislative authorization. Notably, in Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the 
Supreme Court rejected lower-court efforts to elaborate procedures that might 
serve oversight values.9 The Court held that courts lack authority to require an 
agency to receive and consider evidence in a rulemaking proceeding beyond the 
duties mandated by the APA.10 More generally, the courts often decline to 
review agency action where there is “no law to apply.”11 They say that where 
rules are too incomplete or ambiguous to permit an assessment of authority, 
there is nothing for them to do.12 
On the other hand, there is a common law–like counter-trend in canonical 
administrative law, in which courts demand safeguards with little or no 
attention to statutory mandate.13 This trend has an ambiguous relation to the 
backward-looking view of legitimacy. When the courts follow this trend, they 
require administrators to give consideration to specified interests and to 
provide reasonable explanations of their decisions (and when the explanations 
are not forthcoming, the courts intervene more directively). This requirement 
can be quite demanding, as in the landmark case Motor Vehicles Manufacturers 
Association v. State Farm, where the Court insisted that the agency demonstrate 
that its decision took account of concerns and alternative proposals raised by 
stakeholders.14 The demand for reasonable consideration and explanation could 
be related to prior-authorization concerns. The explanation might assist the 
Court in assessing the conformity of the action in question to the governing 
 
 7.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 8.  Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1671–76 (1975).  
 9.  435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).  
 10.  Id. at 548. 
 11.  See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (stating that the 
APA does not permit review where there is “no law to apply”). 
 12.  See infra notes 37–58. 
 13.  See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293 (2012).  
 14.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983).  
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legislation. However, the oversight rationale for the requirement seems at least 
as strong. The explanation enables the legislature and the electorate to better 
perceive and assess official practice. 
Some specific statutory and regulatory provisions that are plainly motivated 
by oversight values have been incorporated into the canon. The most important 
are those in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).15 FOIA, however, seems 
peripheral to the main concerns of the canonical doctrine. It is in the canon 
mainly by virtue of the largely accidental fact that it was codified in the APA. 
Although the reasonable-consideration-and-explanation doctrine and FOIA 
are important, they are also quite limited from an ambitious oversight 
perspective. The former applies most often in the narrow context of 
rulemaking, and although it is not in principle restricted to that context, the 
courts often decline to apply it in other contexts.16 FOIA applies only to 
“records” that the administrator has chosen to create (or must create under 
other law); it does not affirmatively require the creation of records. Other APA 
provisions do require disclosure of basic information about the agency’s 
organization, operations, and procedures.17 But nothing in the statute requires 
the agency to generate and disclose information about, for example, the 
activities of its frontline agents or the general efficacy its efforts. 
B. The Dialectic of Rule and Discretion 
Portrayals of bureaucracy emphasize hierarchy and coordination through 
relatively inflexible rule. In this form of organization, decisions about goals and 
decisions about implementation are strongly separated. Decisions about goals 
are a matter of political choice. Decisions about implementation are technical 
matters. The primary tool of implementation is the rule. Rules are understood 
as both general (they apply across a range of situations) and narrow (they 
regulate only a specific dimension of each situation). Although the totality of 
rules for a given program within a bureaucracy reflects a coherent vision, 
individual rules can be applied unreflectively without reference to the larger 
understanding that unites them. Rules transmit upper-level decisions more or 
less mechanically. 
Most accounts imply that rules are relatively stable over time. Stability is 
implied in the strong separation between conception (rulemaking), which 
occurs at the top, and execution (implementation), which ultimately occurs at 
the frontline. The distance between rulemakers and implementers suggests that 
it may take time for information about the effects of the rules to travel from the 
frontline to the top and for new rules to be effectively communicated from the 
top to the frontline. 
Rule-enforced hierarchy is valued in the private sector for efficiency. It 
 
 15.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012) (requiring certain agency meetings to be 
open to the public). 
 16.  See cases cited infra notes 37–58. 
 17.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(1).  
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minimizes dependence on the scarce capacity for complex judgment and the 
time consumed in coordinating activity. It is valued in the public sphere on 
democratic as well as efficiency grounds. The democracy point is that rule-based 
organization most effectively links administrative conduct to the decisions of 
elected officials, and hence, to the electorate. The understanding of public 
administration as presumptively rule-based was highly influential in the United 
States from the beginning of the twentieth century through the New Deal 
period.18 
However, most versions of this understanding accord some room in rule-
based organization for informal discretionary judgment. The view of 
government as a balance of rules and discretion was classically formulated by 
John Locke. His Second Treatise of Government emphasized the importance of 
checking arbitrary official power by subjecting it to “stated rules.”19 However, it 
recognized that unforeseen situations will arise where either the legislature has 
“given no direction” or “strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm.” 
In response, there must be a realm of “prerogative,” which Locke defines as 
“nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule.”20 
Many modern views have qualified this notion with the hope that expertise 
can discipline informal judgment. But, to varying degrees, proponents of these 
views have tended to consider expert judgment to be inarticulate or ineffable 
and hence capable of only limited explanation and review. Progressive and New 
Deal theorists argued for a strong role for non-rule-governed expertise at the 
administrative summit and, in some cases, like child welfare, at the frontline. 
They thought of such judgment as structured but only in ways that were not 
readily demonstrable.21 
After World War II, a further set of qualifications to the rule-governed 
character of public administration was increasingly accepted. Portrayals of 
“street-level bureaucracy” emphasized that rule departure by frontline officials 
 
 18.  See generally FRANK GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN 
GOVERNMENT (1900); LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: OLD AND NEW 79–101 
(2006). On the classical view more generally, see FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956–58, 973–74 (Guenther 
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).  
 19.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 405 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960). 
 20. Id. at 421, 425. The possible role of informal judgment enters Max Weber’s formulation in the 
guise of the “England problem”—the question of how England was able to develop economically 
without the degree of rule-based administration that Weber thought important to successful capitalism. 
David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 720, 746–47 (1972). 
 21.  E.g., James M. Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 148–51 (1938). Charles Reich 
caricatured the Progressive and New Deal proponents of the administrative state. He stated that the 
proponents believed in a “new kind of decision” as to which “checks and balances and other restraints . 
. . would not be relevant . . . .” Quoting John Griffiths, he continued: The ‘administrative’ decision was 
conceived of as that right decision which will be clear to an ‘expert’ if, without the help (they would 
have said, the hindrance) of criteria, standards, rules, etc., he confronts a vast array of raw data.” 
Charles A. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227, 1235 (1966) (quoting John 
Griffiths). See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF 
DELINQUENCY (1977) (describing frontline discretion).  
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was pervasive and routine. Some departures were malign, resulting from the 
pursuit of deviant goals by the officials, but some amount of malign 
noncompliance was inevitable or even optimal, because it could be eliminated 
only at intolerable cost. Other departures were benign. They took the form of 
street-level judgments of the sort Locke’s “prerogative” idea contemplated for 
top-level officials—judgments designed to mitigate the surface inflexibility of 
the rules in order to vindicate their underlying purposes. Two routes for 
improvement suggested themselves. Analysts could try to identify those areas in 
which rules could be tightened to eliminate street-level discretion without 
incurring excessive costs. Alternatively, the state might seek to influence the 
exercise of discretion in a more benign direction through recruitment or 
socialization of frontline officials.22 
This bureaucratic view of administration as a matter of hierarchically 
imposed rules supplemented by unaccountable discretion should be compared 
to a newer understanding of organization that de-emphasizes hierarchy and 
seeks adaptability to context and changing circumstances at all organizational 
levels. The postbureaucratic understanding of organization rejects any strong 
distinction between decisions about goals and decisions about implementation. 
It views implementation, not only or even primarily as compliance with 
previously enacted norms, but also as a course of discovery and elaboration. If 
change in bureaucracy is episodic, in postbureaucratic organization, it is 
continuous. 
In the postbureaucratic view, the paradigmatic norm is not the rule, but the 
plan. A plan is more comprehensive than a rule. It provides a general 
framework for a program. The plan contains specific norms, but they do not 
stand apart from the plan. It is expected that the norms will be applied in light 
of the plan at all levels. Plans may contain rules, but their most characteristic 
norms lack the categorical quality that the bureaucratic view attributes to the 
rule. A rule either applies or does not, and when it applies, it demands 
conformity. By contrast, plan norms are often presumptive; agents may be 
authorized to depart from the prescription when compliance would not serve 
the purposes set forth in the plan. Typically, however, they must signal and 
explain their departures in a way that triggers both administrative review of 
their conduct and reassessment of the rule.23 Plans may also contain indicators, 
 
 22.  JERRY M. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CLAIMS 145–71 (1983). Influential works on street-level bureaucracy include MICHAEL LIPSKY, 
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1980); JAMES 
Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968). An important earlier demonstration of the need 
for informal judgment in the private sector is ALVIN GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL 
BUREAUCRACY (1964). 
 23.  For example: 
If the individual actually performing the activity cannot or believes he should not follow the 
procedure governing that activity as written, he shall place the system/component into a stable 
and safe condition and inform the responsible supervisor. Situations such as this could occur if 
the procedure is found to be inadequate for the intended task, if unexpected results occur, or 
if two more procedures governing the activity conflict. The supervisor shall resolve the 
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which are intended to measure changes in performance over time or in relation 
to comparable institutions. 
In addition, plans are provisional. A good plan provides for frequent or 
continuous reassessment of practices and goals.  It provides for monitoring of 
the effects of practice in achieving its goals. The bureaucratic view sees 
monitoring as a way to ensure compliance with promulgated norms. The newer 
view sees monitoring, in addition, as a process of reassessing the efficacy of the 
practices these norms dictate.24 
Both views of organization prescribe that the practices of the organization’s 
agents conform to the organization’s articulated norms, but for different 
reasons. The primary role of articulated norms in bureaucratic organization is 
to restrict discretion. Their primary role in postbureaucratic organization is 
transparency. When practice conforms to norms, an observer can read off what 
is happening from the norms. This facilitates reassessment and change by 
enabling agents in different positions in the organization to better perceive what 
practices are producing the results they observe. Hewing to articulated norms 
also facilitates public oversight and accountability. 
Canonical administrative law reflects the influence of the bureaucratic view 
of organization in two ways: (1) in its preoccupation with the enactment or 
initiation of administrative measures and its relative indifference to their 
application or implementation, and (2) in its tendency to divide administration 
into realms of heavily regulated practice and realms of unaccountable 
 
discrepancy in the procedure by either [determining that the procedure is in fact adequate or] 
submitting a procedure change. 
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION, GOOD PRACTICE—CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 
(July 1984) 18–19 (quoted in JOSEPH REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE EVOLUTION OF 
NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 82 (1996); see generally William H. Simon, Toyota 
Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE E.U. 
AND THE U.S. (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).  
 24.  A convenient if crude distillation of the postbureaucratic view can be found in a slogan called 
the “Demming cycle.” It prescribes as a paradigm for conduct at all levels of the organization: “Plan, 
Do, Study, Act.” “Plan” entails a statement of general goals, means to achieve them, and indicators to 
evaluate progress in attaining goals. “Do” entails execution of the plan and connotes practice tightly 
configured to plan. “Study” entails examination, documentation, and analysis of experienced 
consequences in relation to anticipated ones and reassessment of the plan in the light of this experience. 
“Act” involves revision of the plan. The cycle operates continuously, and the activities occur at all 
levels of the organization. See GERALD J. LANGLEY ET AL., THE IMPROVEMENT GUIDE: A 
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 23–24, 97–104, 442–43, 
454 (2009); JEFFREY LIKER, THE TOYOTA WAY: 14 MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES FROM THE WORLD’S 
GREATEST MANUFACTURER 263–65 (2004). For two especially influential accounts of post-
bureaucracy in the private sector, see PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND 
PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1994) and JAMES P. WOMACK & DANIEL T. JONES, 
LEAN THINKING: BANISH WASTE AND CREATE WEALTH IN YOUR CORPORATION (1996). For public 
sector applications, see DONALD KETTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 33–150 (2002); Lynn, supra note 18, at 
104–82; MARK H. MOORE, RECOGNIZING PUBLIC VALUE (2013). The convergence of public and 
private sectors is analyzed in Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A 
COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 106–56 
(Charles Hecksher & Paul Adler eds., 2006).  
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discretion. 
Strikingly, rulemaking is the only form of administrative—as opposed to 
adjudicatory—conduct extensively addressed in the APA.25 Edward Rubin has 
emphasized that the statute virtually defines other forms of administration out 
of existence by characterizing all forms of agency “disposition” other than 
rulemaking as “adjudication” (and by then leaving largely unregulated all forms 
of adjudication not involving hearings).26 An equally eccentric definition occurs 
in Executive Order 12,866, where “regulatory action” is said to mean action that 
“promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation [of a] rule.”27 This 
order mandates cost-benefit analysis and preannouncement White House 
review of regulations. It is the one executive initiative to achieve prominence in 
the canon (as measured by the attention to it in casebooks). It is innovative in 
some respects, but it is entirely conventional in its conflation of administration 
with the promulgation of rules. 
For this specialized category of “regulatory action,” the APA imposes 
procedures that are potentially quite demanding. The statute prescribes a 
“notice-and-comment” process whereby rules are announced; citizens are given 
a period in which to submit comments, and the regulator must consider and 
respond to the comments.28 Applying “hard look” judicial review, courts have 
made demands for explanation and response to comments that create 
substantial risks of reversal for controversial rules. This process has been 
extended by the White House review required by Executive Order 12,866 and 
by a further stage in which Congress reviews and can abrogate the rule prior to 
effectiveness (though it rarely does so).29 
The canonical administrative law regime provides a good deal of 
transparency and opportunity for public discussion. On the other hand, many 
believe that it goes too far, entailing pointless expense and permitting 
 
 25.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7) (2012). 
 26.  Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 
CORNELL L. REV.95, 110–12, 123–31 (2003). Rubin continues, “[the APA provides] no foothold, no 
conceptual framework, for imposing requirements on most actions that [lie] beyond the ambit of rule-
making and formal adjudication.” Id. at 126. I have relied heavily on Rubin’s critique of the limits of 
canonical doctrine, but his overall argument ignores the distinction between bureaucratic and 
performance-based organization that is central to the argument here. See also Alan B. Morrison, 
Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 79, 98 (2007) (emphasizing that canonical doctrine is primarily about rulemaking and 
adjudication). The constrained vocabulary of canonical doctrine accounts for the fact that many agency 
decisions that resolve policy issues affecting large numbers of people are referred to in the canon as 
“adjudications.” Proceedings on such matters as the licensing of power plants, the allocation of 
broadcast spectrum, or the authorization of bank mergers are often styled as adjudicatory. When this 
happens, the procedures are different, though typically no less elaborate than rulemaking. Like 
rulemaking, these procedures reflect a tendency to focus on initiation of policy as opposed to 
implementation.  
 27.  Exec. Order No. 12866, § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2012).  
 28.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 29.  See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTS 213–34, 665–66 (2011).  
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opportunistic delay by private parties.30 The rule focus of canonical doctrine 
continues even after rules become effective. Courts require agencies to comply 
with rules in a broad range of situations, including when the agencies seek 
coercive enforcement against private parties and when they respond to requests 
for individual welfare benefits. Rules, once enacted, are often hard to change, 
since change normally requires going back to the rulemaking procedure. 
However, the intensely controlled realm of rulemaking and rule compliance 
coexists with a more extensive realm of relatively uncontrolled discretion. If the 
doctrine is strict in some areas, it is strikingly permissive in others. To begin 
with, some important areas of government activity are exempted from 
rulemaking and other canonical safeguards. Notably, the administrative law of 
national security is full of “grey holes” and “black holes” that make it a weak 
mechanism of democratic accountability. The courts tend to dismiss challenges 
to practices that implicate national security on the grounds that they originate 
in the White House, which is not an “agency” subject to the APA; that they are 
within the statutory rulemaking exemption for matters involving a “military or 
foreign affairs function”; that they involve nonreviewable “generalized 
conduct” rather than reviewable “agency action”; or that they are “committed 
to agency discretion by law.” Even where the courts reach the merits, they tend 
to apply a deferential “soft look” standard.31 
More generally, although an agency is subject to extensive controls once it 
decides to make rules in an area where exceptions do not apply, it retains in 
many areas virtually unreviewable discretion as to whether to make rules at all. 
Rulemaking procedures apply to “legislative rules”—rules that represent the 
exercise of legislatively conferred discretion. What rules qualify for this 
designation is substantially a function of how the agency chooses to characterize 
the rule. Some organic statutes require rulemaking, but some do not. Even 
those that do require rulemaking leave the agency broad discretion as to a given 
rule’s level of specificity. 
As far as the APA is concerned, an agency is typically free to operate on the 
basis of interpretive rules and nonbinding “guidance” norms that do not require 
notice-and-comment.32 Indeed, it is often free to dispense even with nonbinding 
 
 30.  Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Questions of Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363, 391–92 (1986) (suggesting that strict review of rulemaking makes the agency more reluctant 
“to change the status quo”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 158–80 (1997) (explaining how judicial review of rulemaking 
creates opportunities for strategic delay); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Improving 
Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004) (arguing that the 
regulatory process tends to be excessively focused on the “front end” and insufficiently capable of 
ongoing adjustment).  
 31.  Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1106–31 
(2009). 
 32.  See, e.g., Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1035–36 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 
73, 79–83 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
859, 876–81 (2009); Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L. J. 1463, 1466–68, 1472–73, 
1480–81 (1992).  
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norms and leave matters to ungoverned frontline discretion.33 Agencies also 
have broad freedom to announce new norms through adjudication, rather than 
through rulemaking.34 True, an agency generally gets some benefits from 
enacting legislative rules. In principle, legislative rules qualify for Chevron 
deference, and they satisfy the notice requirements for coercive enforcement 
(though so can nonlegislative rules).35 However, as we have noted, rulemaking 
often entails large costs. Canonical administrative law leaves the agency with 
extensive freedom as to how to balance benefits and costs.36 
Where administrative action does not take the form of rulemaking or 
adjudication, judicial review is often minimal. In principle, review is not limited 
to rulemaking and adjudication. There is even a presumption of reviewability 
for all agency action,37 but the presumption is easily rebutted for much activity. 
As Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has said, “[R]eview remains either unavailable 
or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary decisions involving 
national security, foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory enforcement, 
public benefits, and investigation or prosecution.”38 
There is a general reluctance to review when the agency’s alleged failure is 
passive rather than active. Notwithstanding the APA language that makes 
“failure to act” reviewable and that authorizes courts to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld,”39 courts treat many forms of agency inaction as 
nonreviewable. In refusing to consider whether the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) had abused its discretion in failing to regulate drugs 
used in capital punishment, the Supreme Court explained, “When an agency 
refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an 
individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas 
that courts often are called upon to protect.”40 And an agency’s failure to 
exercise its authority to enforce enacted law is generally a matter of 
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion.41 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 348 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that subordinate official’s refusal to certify an applicant for tribal status not 
reviewable where the “executive branch has not sought to canalize the discretion of its subordinate 
officials by means of regulations”).  
 34.  See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 291 n.21, 294 (1974).  
 35.  See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 36.  See Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Methods of Administrative 
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 157, 165–70 (2000) (suggesting that increasing formality of the 
rulemaking process has induced greater resort to informal modes of regulation). In a study of the 
Department of the Treasury, David Zaring shows that canonical doctrine has little influence there 
because many activities are covered by statutory exemptions, and with respect to others, the 
department is able to avoid rulemaking and formal adjudication. See supra note 1.   
 37.  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), overruled on other grounds 
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). 
 38.  Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 229 
n.2 (2006). 
 39.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
 40.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).  
 41.  Ellison v. Connor, 153 F.3d 247, 251 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding Corps of Engineers decisions 
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As the doctrine plays out, it tends to minimize review of precisely those 
practices that the postbureaucratic view of organization regards as central—
planning, monitoring, and reassessment. 
1. Planning 
Two revealing cases on planning arose under the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 
an environmental group charged that the Secretary of the Interior was making 
decisions about the use of federal lands in an ad hoc manner that was both 
arbitrary and excessively deferential to mining interests.42 It sought, inter alia, 
specific enforcement of the statutory mandate that the administrators “develop, 
maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts 
or areas for the use of the public lands.”43 The Court held the claim not to be an 
“agency action” or “failure to act” reviewable under the APA: 
The [plaintiff’s claim] does not refer to a single [Bureau of Land Management (BLM)] 
order or regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and 
regulations. [Rather, it challenges] the continuing (and thus constantly changing) 
operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation applications and the 
classifications of public lands and developing land use plans as required by the 
FLPMA.44 
Apparently worried that the claim would require courts to undertake 
comprehensive administrative direction, the Court insisted that the APA did 
not authorize “wholesale correction” of agency noncompliance but only 
challenges of “manageable proportions.”45 
The Court, per Justice Scalia, gave a textualist gloss to the point in Norton v. 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.46 This time, plaintiffs sought to compel the 
agency to implement a plan it had adopted under the FLPMA, requiring 
curtailment of off-road vehicle use on various federal lands.47 Justice Scalia 
pointed out that the examples of reviewable “agency action” mentioned in the 
APA—“rule, order, license, sanction . . . relief”—all involved “circumscribed, 
discrete” actions and, applying the ejusdem generis canon, concluded that a 
broad failure to plan did not qualify.48 He suggested that this interpretation was 
reinforced by the concern that judicial enforcement of such broad norms would 
involve inappropriate judicial intrusion into “day-to-day” agency management.49 
 
regarding applications to use Corps property unreviewable); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
728 F.2d 518, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding agency’s refusal to intervene to halt bank marketing 
practice unreviewable); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (holding 
compliance with statute requiring that military supplies be shipped on U.S. vessels when available 
“committed to agency discretion” by law).  
 42.  497 U.S. 871, 879 (1990). 
 43.  Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982)). 
 44.  Id. at 890. 
 45.  Id. at 873. 
 46.  542 U.S. 55, 67 (2004). 
 47.  Id. at 60. 
 48.  Id. at 62–65. 
 49.  Id. at 67. The Sixth Circuit followed Norton in Am. Civil Liberty Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
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2. Monitoring 
That the agency has unreviewable discretion with respect to enforcement 
decisions does not necessarily imply that the agency has such discretion with 
respect to decisions to monitor the conduct of those it regulates or of its own 
frontline agents. An agency that monitors effectively would have information 
that would tend to make its enforcement decisions more reliable and hence 
more worthy of deference. 
Nevertheless, the courts tend to treat monitoring decisions as unreviewable. 
For example, the Sixth Circuit refused to entertain a suit protesting the failure 
of the Department and Health and Human Services (HHS) to collect data on 
the racial incidence of services provided by federally supported health care 
facilities.50 The plaintiffs argued that the failure made it impossible for the 
government to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act.51 The court rejected the argument that monitoring decisions should 
be distinguished from unreviewable prosecutorial ones: “The mechanism by 
and extent to which HHS ‘monitors’ as well as ‘enforces’ compliance fall 
squarely within the agency’s exercise of discretion.”52 
Canonical doctrine also holds that decisions of frontline personnel are not 
reviewable “agency action” under the APA unless the agency has chosen to 
review them, thus implying that there is no duty to review.53 The same premise 
surfaces in the suggestion that it is a matter of agency discretion whether to 
“canalize the discretion of its subordinate officers” through rules, rather than 
leaving them to relatively ungoverned ad hoc decisions.54 
 
493 F.3d 644, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,128 S.Ct. 1334 (2008) (holding that National Security 
Agency practices of warrantless electronic surveillance are “generalized conduct” and therefore not 
“agency action” challengeable under the APA).  
 50.  Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1129–31 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 51.  Id. at 1123. 
 52.  Id. at 1125 (quoting Gillis v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 573 (6th 
Cir. 1985)). See also Sprint Comm’ns v. FCC, 76 F.3d 1221, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding FCC refusal 
to investigate particular matter not reviewable); Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 170 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to review HUD decisions 
regarding investigation of possible violations of rules on subsidized housing discrimination against 
handicapped).  
 53.  Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 644–45 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding SEC “no-action” letter by 
lower-tier staff not reviewable because an “agency’s decision to refrain from an investigation or an 
enforcement action is generally unreviewable,” but stating that review might be available where, as in 
an earlier case “the Commission examined the staff’s no-action determination and accepted it.”).  
 54.  Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 348 (7th Cir. 2001). 
Whether there is a general duty, constitutional or otherwise, to discipline lower-tier discretion through 
rules or guidance is, in fact, a mystery. Certainly there is no clear duty. The duty is sometimes denied. 
See, e.g., Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 448 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Other cases have ordered the 
promulgation of rules or guidance, though both the scope of the duty and its source (whether based on 
the relevant organic statute, the constitution, or the APA) are typically ambiguous. See, e.g., Morton v. 
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Peter 
Strauss et al, supra note 29, at 821–26.  
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3. Reassessment  
An agency has only weakly enforceable duties to reconsider its norms once 
promulgated. Although courts often take a “hard look” at legislative rules at 
the point of promulgation, they review decisions to leave promulgated rules in 
place softly. Where the agency volunteers a legal reason for inaction, the courts 
may review it, and where the agency itself initiates a proceeding to reconsider a 
rule, the courts may demand a reasoned explanation of the agency’s failure to 
follow through.55 But where the agency stands tacitly inert, intervention is 
unlikely.56 
A recent Ninth Circuit case illustrates the influence of bureaucratic 
conceptions of organization on claims based on failure to reassess.57 The Federal 
Central Valley Project, the largest water-management system in the country, 
operates under federal statutes that incorporate state standards designed to 
protect wildlife habitat. One such standard is the “Vernalis salinity standard” 
that imposes a limit on salinity as measured at a particular point in the system. 
The Project proposed to satisfy this standard by regulating certain flows under 
the “New Melones Interim Operations Plan.” The plan, which had been 
adopted seven years earlier, “was initially intended to be temporary, but, for 
lack of a better program, the Bureau [of Reclamation had] continued to operate 
the CVP under [it] since its adoption.” Projections in the plan indicated that the 
salinity standard would be exceeded in about one month out of ten. The 
plaintiffs argued that such a pattern would not satisfy the statute and sought 
relief compelling the agency to revise the plan. The court dismissed on the 
ground that the plaintiffs had not shown sufficient likelihood of harm: Their 
mistake, according to the court, was to assume “the Bureau’s continuous and 
unswerving adherence to the Plan,” whereas the Bureau regarded the plan 
merely as a “starting point” from which it would readily depart if necessary to 
satisfy the salinity standard. Accepting the Bureau’s position, the court quoted 
Dwight Eisenhower: “Plans are nothing; planning is everything.”58 
The quoted language is a central maxim of the postbureaucratic view of 
organization, but the court misses the point. “Plans are nothing” means that one 
must be prepared to depart from the plan in response to unforeseen 
contingencies; it does not mean that an adequate plan can ignore foreseen 
contingencies. Before the contingency arises, it is the second part of the maxim 
that governs. If “planning is everything,” then the agency should be struggling 
to provide as articulately and coherently as it can for key risks, and a court with 
responsibility for enforcing the statute should assess these efforts. The agency is 
not making adequate effort when it offers only a seven-year-old “interim” 
 
 55.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007); Am. Horse Protection Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 
F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Where an agency does reassess, its decisions will often be immune to review 
if they do not involve revision or abrogation of a rule. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).  
 56.  WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  
 57.  Cent. Delta Water Agency v. Bureau of Reclamation, 452 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 58.  Id. at 1025–27. 
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document that fails to address major known risks.59 
Although this decision turns on the requirement of irreparable harm for 
injunctive relief, it is consistent with suggestions in other cases that provisional 
agency norms and nonbinding guidelines do not qualify as reviewable “final 
rules.”60 Such holdings seem to assume a world in which the key drivers of 
public programs—and hence the proper focus of judicial accountability 
efforts—are inflexible, hard-to-change rules that address relatively stable, well-
understood problems. 
4. Judicial Intervention: Compliance Versus Reasonable Consideration-and-
Explanation 
As noted earlier, the prior-authorization and oversight conceptions of 
legitimacy are associated with different forms of judicial intervention. The 
prior-authorization view is associated with narrowly prescriptive orders 
requiring compliance with enacted rules.  The oversight view is associated with 
demands for reasoned consideration and explanation. Both modes of 
intervention appear in the canonical doctrine, but there seems to be a bias in 
favor of the former. 
The courts’ notion of justiciability seems constrained by the bureaucratic 
view of organization. Courts are most willing to intervene in connection with 
rules, which they tend to understand either as norms of the type governed by 
APA rulemaking or more generally as discrete and inflexible norms, whether 
promulgated by the legislature or by the agency itself. But when the courts 
encounter more general and provisional norms, they have a harder time 
conceiving of a role to play. As a result, in such situations, they often deny 
review, saying that there is “no law to apply,” or that they cannot risk disrupting 
coherent administrative practices, or that they should not usurp legislatively 
conferred discretion. These rationales tend to assume that intervention would 
take a compliance-type form. They often do not make sense with reference to 
reasonable-consideration-and-explanation intervention. 
A judicial demand for reasonable consideration and explanation need not 
be based on determinate substantive rules. As illustrated by State Farm, the 
courts can, without specific guidance from the organic statute, still ascertain that 
the administrator has exercised discretion on the basis of generally appropriate 
 
 59.  Although, in principle, performance-based organization calls for rigor and precision, in 
practice its rhetoric of adaptation is often used to excuse laxness and vagueness. For example, J.B. Ruhl 
and Robert Fischman observe that in environmental protection “adaptive management” often 
degenerates into “‘on-the-fly’ management that promises some loosely described response to whatever 
circumstances arise.” J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 424, 441 (2010). See also Alejandro Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in 
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 316–48 (2007) (describing design and implementation 
failures in the Department of the Interior’s Habitat Conservation Program under the Endangered 
Species Act).  
 60.  E.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wildlife Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 69–71 (2004) (suggesting that the 
provisionality of the land use plans in issue might make them not “final” agency action and hence 
unreviewable under the APA).  
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public norms, that she has considered the legitimate interests and arguments of 
stakeholders, and that she has sufficiently developed and considered relevant 
evidence. Far from disrupting coherent administration, mandating reasonable 
consideration and explanation encourages the administrator to understand her 
decision as integral to a general plan. And to the extent explanation makes 
agency practice more transparent, it enhances legislative accountability. 
The bias against reasonable-consideration-and-explanation intervention is 
evident in the Court’s refusal to enforce the statutory land use planning 
requirement in Lujan on the ground that “respondent cannot seek wholesale 
improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the 
Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are 
normally made.”61 From outside the premises of the canon, this assertion seems 
to miss the point. The plaintiff purported to be enforcing the statute as enacted, 
not seeking revision. The “improvement” the plaintiff was seeking—reflection 
on and coherent articulation of general policy—would have facilitated 
legislative oversight and reconsideration, not preempted it. It would, of course, 
have required the Court to assess the adequacy of the plan.  However, such 
assessment could have been made in terms of process norms if the statute 
provided no substantive guidance. 
True, requiring reasonable consideration and explanation is not costless. It 
takes time and effort to produce explanations, and the courts will sometimes 
mistakenly decide that explanation has been inadequate and will thereby 
impose costs by inappropriately delaying administrative initiatives. But there is 
no reason to think such costs lower with compliance-oriented review. In many 
situations, specific enforcement of discrete rules is more disruptive and invasive 
than broader oversight-type intervention. 
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt illustrates this point. Congress provided in the 
Endangered Species Act that the Secretary of the Interior must, within a year of 
designating a species as endangered, publish a rule specifying habitat critical to 
its survival.62 However, the Secretary concluded that Congress did not 
appropriate sufficient funds to enable the Department to accomplish the task 
within the statutory deadline. In a rule designating the Rio Grande silvery 
minnow as endangered, the Secretary explained that the department was unable 
to meet the habitat deadline for this and other species. The Secretary then 
published a tiered schedule for working through its rulemaking backlog, 
ranking various projects in order of urgency. When environmentalists sued to 
force the Secretary to comply with the deadline for the silvery minnow, the 
court held that resource constraints could not justify a refusal to comply with 
“mandatory, nondiscretionary duties” imposed by statute and instructed the 
lower court to order the Secretary to promulgate a rule designating habitat for 
the silvery minnow “as soon as possible.”63 
 
 61.  Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) (emphasis omitted).  
 62.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2012). 
 63.  Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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If the court had taken a reasonable-consideration-and-explanation view, it 
probably would have denied relief. The administrator’s judgment about how to 
allocate scarce resources (a category of judgment which courts sometimes single 
out as entitled to exceptional deference64) was supported by a plan and by a 
reasoned, good-faith explanation that the plaintiffs did not challenge. The court 
could have interpreted the statutory command as implicitly qualified by the 
availability of sufficient resources, but the court instead read it in a textualist 
manner as a categorical injunction and ordered more or less strict compliance 
with it. Although the planning order sought in Lujan would not necessarily have 
interfered with the Secretary’s ability to organize implementation coherently, 
this discrete compliance order had a high likelihood of doing so. Under the 
court’s approach, the Secretary could be forced to obey a series of piecemeal 
instructions that do not reflect anyone’s judgment about the proper allocation 
of scarce public resources, but simply the distribution of private litigation 
resources and the accidents of litigation timing. 
5. Conclusion 
The tortuous contours of reviewability doctrine reflect the presuppositions 
of the bureaucratic view of organization. Control is intense with respect to the 
form of administration this view treats as central—the rule—and relatively lax 
with respect to the forms emphasized by the postbureaucratic view—plans, 
monitoring, and reassessment. At the same time, the courts often assume a 
fairly rigid dichotomy between rule-based organization and unaccountable 
discretion. Where rule-based enforcement is not plausible, the courts often 
ignore the possibility of reasonable consideration-and-explanation 
accountability. 
The doctrine seems dysfunctional. Rulemaking is overregulated, and rules 
are overenforced, whereas non-rule-governed activities are likely to be 
underregulated. The resulting incentives are perverse. Agencies that seek to 
make themselves accountable through rulemaking face high costs that they 
could avoid by resort to less transparent forms of administration. And courts 
are encouraged to focus their accountability-inducing efforts on the agencies 
that take the most initiative to make themselves accountable. But the need for 
intervention is likely to be less with such agencies than with those who do not 
make such efforts. 
C. The Reactive Approach to Error Detection 
The conventional understanding of bureaucracy assumes that administrative 
supervision eliminates most errors. But even with optimal enforcement, 
problems may remain because of an irreducible amount of random rule 
departures or because of idiosyncratic circumstances that do not fit the 
assumptions of the rule. These cases can be addressed through a backstop 
process. The backstop officials may operate under more flexible norms that 
 
 64.  E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).  
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permit more individualized consideration than line administration. Greater 
discretion can be seen as a form of Lockean “prerogative” that mitigates the 
harshness of rules in unforeseen circumstances. Modern commenters also 
defend discretion to consider context as an expression of respect for the dignity 
of citizens affected by a rule.65 
Consistency of decision across cases is not a central value in this perspective. 
The goal is either to fit the norms to idiosyncratic circumstances or to afford 
some subjective satisfaction to the individual claimant. Thus, the success of each 
resolution can be measured independently of its relation to decisions in other 
disputes or in line administration. In the private sector, the dispute-resolution 
task may be conferred on a specialized complaint department with authority to 
depart from the rules that govern line administrators. In the public sector, the 
task will be given to judges or administrative roles modeled on judges 
substantially independent of administrative supervision. 
An objection to the focus on case-by-case fairness is that it slights the value 
of horizontal equity—that is, treating like cases alike.66 Proponents of 
postbureaucratic organization have a further concern: Case-by-case resolution 
impairs transparency. Observers cannot infer decisions in disputed cases from 
the relevant norms. Even if the records of disputes are public, the overall 
quality and tenor of decisions can be assessed only by digesting the full records 
of large amounts of cases. Postbureaucratic organization tries to achieve 
transparency by hewing conduct to articulated norms. Transparency enhances 
accountability.67 In addition, it facilitates redesign.68 Postbureaucratic 
organization often deals with problems in which knowledge and circumstances 
are varied and volatile. In these situations, it often does not make sense to see 
errors as arising from idiosyncrasy. It is at least as likely that errors arise from 
the suboptimal design of the system. In that case, errors contain diagnostic 
information potentially relevant to systemic improvement. This information is 
lost in low-visibility, case-by-case problem solving. Thus, postbureaucratic 
industrial engineering forbids ad hoc, low-visibility responses to production 
glitches of the sort often found in accounts of both Taylorist production and 
street-level bureaucracy.69 The paradigmatic response in postbureaucratic 
 
 65.  See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 
28 (1976). 
 66.  See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1997–98, 2007–10 (2012). 
 67.  THE ISO 14000 HANDBOOK 196 (Joseph Casio ed., 1996). 
 68.  Productivity Press Development Team, STANDARDIZED WORK FOR THE OPERATOR 12 
(2002) (“Only when you have standardization can you systematically improve your operations without 
creating chaos, and thereby gain adherence throughout your system when a better way is discovered.”).  
 69.  An example from industrial production is the arrival of an auto fender at a paint station with a 
small patch of dirt. The traditional response is either to paint over it and leave it for an end-of-the-line 
rework department or to improvise some intervention to clean it off with whatever materials are at 
hand. See John Paul MacDuffie, The Road to Root Cause: Shop-Floor Problem-Solving at Three Auto 
Assembly Plants, 43 MGMT. SCI. 497, 500–01 (1997).   
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organization is to “stop the line” in order to trigger a deliberation on the 
appropriate systemic reform to deal with the larger dysfunction symptomized by 
the glitch. Errors are treated diagnostically. If the enacted rules seem 
inadequate to address the problem, then the response is to rewrite the rules 
immediately. That way, practice continues to be readable from the rules. 
Industrial production lends itself to a higher degree of normative 
specification than activities that require contextualized judgment, such as 
industrial risk assessment or social service design. However, postbureaucratic 
organization has found ways to achieve a measure of norm-governed 
transparency in sectors that depend on such judgment as well. The key is peer 
deliberation and review.70 By discussing how the norms apply to particular 
cases, peers develop consistent understanding, or “inter-rater reliability.” When 
the discussions incorporate people from other disciplines and institutions, they 
extend the range of reliable understanding. 
Error detection in postbureaucratic organization is proactive in both a weak 
and a strong sense. In the weak sense, it uses audit-type procedures that induce 
reviews, rather than relying solely on complaints. If problems are learning 
opportunities rather than manifestations of irreducible idiosyncrasy, then there 
is good reason to seek them out. Such error-detection processes might involve 
merely superficial examinations of compliance with simple norms—“checklist” 
reviews. However, more ambitious efforts combine close examination of 
particular cases with systemic reassessment. Examples include the types of 
incident reporting associated with high-reliability industries like nuclear power 
or aviation or the mortality-morbidity reviews that examine unexpected bad 
outcomes in hospitals.71 
The reactive view of error detection dominates canonical administrative law. 
The only form of error detection that figures in the canon is the adjudicatory 
hearing regulated in the APA and required in many situations by constitutional 
doctrine and organic statutes. The key convergent mandates of the APA and 
the Constitution are participation by the claimant and independence of the 
 
Here is a public-sector example from a nursing home inspection: 
We observed a Chicago sanitarian point out during an exit conference following an inspection 
that it is against the regulations to have a male and female in adjoining rooms sharing the 
same toilet. The sanitarian concedes that in this particular case neither resident is capable of 
using the toilet and that moving either of them would be upsetting to them. He says that he is 
going to turn a blind eye to the rule for the sake of the residents, but he warns management 
that someone else from the department could come along and cite them for this. 
John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules Versus Standards in Nursing 
Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307, 329 (1995). 
 70.  See generally Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 69 (finding that judgments of nursing 
home inspectors are more consistent under the relatively informal Australian system than under the 
U.S. one, in part because discussion among inspectors leads to convergence).  
 71.  ROBERT MARDER & MARK A. SMITH, EFFECTIVE PEER REVIEW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
CONTEMPORARY DESIGN (2005) (on unexpected outcome reviews in medicine); Rees, supra note 23, 
at 130–49 (on “significant operating event” reporting and analysis in nuclear power regulation). 
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decisionmaker.72 Such hearings must be triggered by a complaint. Neither the 
APA nor the canonical Goldberg v. Kelly line of due process cases requires 
affirmative administrative efforts to identify errors. 
Moreover, the separation of adjudication from line administration tends to 
be assumed or mandated in canonical administrative law. Line administrators 
do not treat hearing dispositions as precedents for their decisions. Just as an 
agency has no enforceable duty to acquire and consider information generally, 
it has no duty to follow up on systemically relevant information disclosed in 
adjudications. 
Peer review, far from being mandated, is in some tension with the norm of 
independent decisionmaking. Administrative law judges (ALJs) tend to resist 
efforts to induce consistent decisionmaking by means other than case-by-case 
appeals of their decisions. They oppose mandated peer exchanges or broad 
performance assessments as interference with the norm of independence. Social 
Security ALJs have engaged for decades in “trench warfare”73 with top 
administrators over efforts to induce more consistency in the ALJs’ decisions, 
including a “[p]eer [r]eview” program.74 The courts have recognized a “right of 
decisional independence” that gives the ALJs standing to challenge supervisory 
efforts.75 Although no such efforts have been enjoined to date, the courts have 
expressed reservations about them.76 
As a form of error detection, the canonical independent hearing has 
manifest limitations. First, in many contexts, people do not have the material or 
informational resources to identify and prosecute claims. Thus, many errors do 
not surface in the hearing process, and even if they surface, they may go 
 
 72.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(c), 557(d)(1)-(2) (affording claimants the right to present arguments and 
evidence, prohibiting decisionmaker from ex parte consultation and requiring that she not be under the 
supervision or direction of agency personnel with “investigative or prosecutorial functions”); Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (holding that due process requires, prior to termination of certain 
welfare benefits, a hearing before an officer who has not participated in making the decision under 
review). See also 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (providing that specified adverse personnel actions against 
administrative law judges may be taken only for “good cause” as determined by the Merit Systems 
Protection Board).  
 73.  JERRY MASHAW, RICHARD MERRILL, & PETER SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 463 (6th ed. 2003). 
 74.  Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 75.  Id. at 15. 
 76.  Id.; Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989); see also, Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. 
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (D.D.C. 1984) (suggesting in dictum that another Social Security 
Administration effort to review adjudicatory decisions showed insensitivity to the decisional 
independence of ALJs). The initiatives challenged in these cases were more hierarchical and coercive 
than the term “peer review” usually connotes, and the courts seemed at least partly concerned that the 
agency was trying to decrease pro-claimant decisions in an unprincipled and intransparent fashion. 
Nevertheless, many of the plaintiffs’ objections would have applied equally to less heavy-handed 
interventions. The history is summarized in Mashaw, Merrill, & Shane, supra note 73, at 461–67. See 
also PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT 
AGENCY 212, 214–21 (describing the “development of a judicial ethos” among hearing examiners in a 
state workers’ compensation program who resisted supervision and insisted that they should be “free to 
decide cases in accordance with our conscience”).  
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unremedied there. For example, studies of some public assistance programs 
have suggested that only a small fraction of erroneous frontline decisions (as 
measured by audit-type review) surface in the hearing process. Such studies led 
Jerry Mashaw some decades ago to argue that effective review requires courts 
to recognize a “management side of due process,” but the canonical doctrine 
has been unresponsive. The focus on case-by-case fairness means also that 
information discovered in the hearing process does not feed back to influence 
line administration.77 
Second, some programs with large volumes of hearings have shown both 
high rates of reversals of line decisions as well as high variance among ALJs in 
adjudicatory decisional patterns. The most salient example is the Social Security 
disability program. Administrative denials of benefits are both appealed at a 
high rate (in many years, half or more) and reversed at a high rate—lately about 
two-thirds.78 In one period, about a fifth of ALJs reversed denials of benefits at 
rates of one-third or below, and about a fifth reversed at rates of two-thirds or 
above. The high rates of both appeals and reversals of appealed decisions 
suggest that reversals are not a function of idiosyncratic factors that might 
generate errors even in a well-configured process of initial decision. They 
suggest that there is something systemically wrong about the line process. The 
variance among adjudicatory decisionmakers suggests that there is something 
systemically wrong with the hearing system. The Social Security Administration 
has sought to address these problems, but nothing in canonical administrative 
law obliges or even encourages it do so.79 
 
 77. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and 
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of the Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social 
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974); see also JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF 
DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 64–77 (1986) (arguing that the reactive “due 
process model” is generally ineffective in protecting beneficiary rights in welfare programs). 
 78.  Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2011, SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 146, 148 (2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ 
di_asr/2011/index.html. 
 79.  As another example, consider the limitations of administrative complaint systems as a 
response to police abuse.  
[E]ven if a significant number of complaints were to be sustained, there is no persuasive 
evidence that this would have a deterrent effect on other officers. [Moreover,] focusing on 
individual complaints tends to make rank and file officers scapegoats for police misconduct 
when such misconduct is the product of an organizational culture that permits it to exist. 
Recognizing this latter point, a number of experts on oversight argue that oversight agencies 
should focus on policies and procedures designed to change the underlying organizational 
culture.  
Samuel Walker, The New World of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department’s “Pattern and 
Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 24 (2003). See also Margo Schlanger, 
Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, A Large Retailer, and Jails and 
Prisons), 2 J. OF TORT L. 44 (2008) (concluding that “it is rare in corrections that . . . information [from 
judicial petitions and administrative grievances] is used to strategize harm reduction”).  
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III 
NONCANONICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Most law that concerns public administration is outside the conventional 
corpus of administrative law. And much of this outside law assumes or enacts a 
different model of public administration from the one that dominates the 
canon. Performance-based organization is prominent in the noncanonical 
output of all three branches. 
A. Statutes 
Some noncanonical administrative law takes the form of general statutes 
that are not codified in the APA mandating practices across agencies and 
programs. A critical landmark is the Legislative Reorganization Act passed in 
1946, the same year as the APA. The Act clarified committee jurisdictions, 
expanded staff, and committed Congress to “continuous watchfulness” over the 
executive branch.80 Since then, legislative oversight processes have grown 
steadily into a vast set of preoccupying pressures on administrators. These 
processes put strong emphasis on transparency, planning, and proactive error 
detection. 
Congress periodically forces administrators to produce information on 
public programs in connection with reauthorization and appropriations hearings 
and special investigations. It also mandates the routine provision of information 
on program operations, requiring extensive annual reports from federal officers. 
These requirements differ from the canonical requirements of FOIA in that 
they mandate not just disclosure of whatever information has been prepared 
independently, but affirmative efforts to generate and organize information. 
While the aim of oversight is in part to ascertain officials’ compliance with 
previously enacted statutes, it is also concerned with assessment of efficacy. A 
notable expression of this concern is the Government Performance and Results 
Act of 1993 (GPRA). The statute has been described as the “centerpiece of a 
statutory framework Congress put in place in the 1990s” to improve efficiency 
and accountability.81 
The GPRA requires each federal agency to prepare a multiyear “strategic 
plan.” The plan must set out a “comprehensive mission statement” as well as 
short- and long-term goals, a description of the process by which the goals were 
set, and an account of the factors on which attainment of the goals depends. 
The agency must annually create a “performance plan,” indicating what 
progress it expects to make in the coming year and setting forth specific 
 
 80.  60 Stat. 812 § 136 (1946). Joel Auerbach calls the statute the “first formal congressional 
endorsement of oversight.” JOEL AUERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 22 (1990). See generally Jack Beerman, Congressional Administration, 
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006); Walter J. Oleszek, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW 
(Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
 81.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 04-38, RESULTS-ORIENTED GOVERNMENT: 
GPRA HAS ESTABLISHED A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR ACHIEVING BETTER RESULTS 25 ( 2004). 
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“performance indicators” for measuring success. At the same time, it must 
produce annually a “program performance” report on the past year’s 
operations, describing efforts to evaluate its activities, measuring performance 
against indicators, and describing actions needed to address unmet goals.82 
Amendments made in 2010 require the agencies to consult with relevant 
congressional committees in developing and revising their plans, and the 
amendments also require the Office of Management and Budget to consult with 
congressional committees on overall “federal priorities.”83 
General oversight processes also address error detection. One important 
oversight practice—“casework” in which congressional staff intervene on behalf 
of complaining constituents—resembles the adjudicatory processes of canonical 
administrative law by being reactive and complaint-driven (as well as opaque 
and devoid of diagnostic value). But oversight also includes notable proactive 
interventions. Congress engages in various forms of audit-type review through 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO). It also has institutionalized a 
general form of internal proactive error detection in the form of inspectors 
general, who conduct investigations and audits in more than seventy agencies. 
Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, they operate with substantial 
independence of the agency’s line administration, and their reports go to 
Congress as well as to the agency leadership (and to the Attorney General in 
case of findings of malfeasance).84 
Performance-based themes also can be found in program-specific forms in 
many (probably most) of the major regulatory and welfare initiatives enacted 
since the 1960s. The newer orientation can be illustrated with three statutes: (1) 
a social welfare statute, Title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 
(WIA);85 (2) a civil rights statute, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
(PREA);86 and (3) a health-and-safety statute, the Food Safety Modernization 
Act of 2011(FSMA).87 The prior-authorization approach to legitimacy does not 
fit any of these statutes. They do not authorize specific conduct so much as 
identify problems and mandate efforts to explore them. The statutes are almost 
 
 82.  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et 
seq.  
 83.  GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, §§ 2(b), (d); 5(a)(3); 31 U.S.C. §§ 
306(b), (d); 1120(a)(3). Commenters suggest that the promise of the GPRA remains unfulfilled under 
current practice, in which agencies tend to adopt vague and undemanding goals and metrics, but that 
feasible reforms might make it a valuable process. Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, 
Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (2008); GAO, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: 
DATA-DRIVEN PERFORMANCE REVIEWS SHOW PROMISE BUT AGENCIES SHOULD EXPLORE HOW 
TO INVOLVE OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES (GAO 13-28, 2013). There is an interesting contrast 
between the lack of interest of recent presidential administrations in GPRA compliance and their 
intense preoccupation with upfront cost-benefit-analysis requirements. 
 84.  See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights From Within?: Inspectors General and National Security 
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2012). 
 85.  Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et seq. 
 86.  Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79; 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601 et seq. 
 87.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-353 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.) 
SIMON_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2015  12:56 AM 
86 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:61 
entirely procedural. They aim to structure activities in ways that make them 
coherent and transparent. To be sure, some procedures are mandated in detail, 
and a court looking for “law to apply” might order an agency to comply with 
these procedural provisions. But the provisions reflect a very different view of 
administration than the canon, which treats as matters of presumptive 
administrative discretion the practices that these statutes regulate most 
intensely, in particular, planning, monitoring, and reassessment. 
All three statutes endorse proactive planning. The WIA sets up a structure 
through which the Department of Labor makes grants to and supervises state 
Workforce Investment Boards, which in turn make grants to and supervise local 
boards. The state and local boards must each develop plans that show how they 
will address worker skill and knowledge deficits.88 The PREA-implementing 
regulations prescribe that each federal and state agency that manages prisons 
engage in “responsive planning” that will produce, among other things, an 
investigative “protocol” for indications of sexual abuse and a “staffing plan” 
that will minimize dangers of abuse.89 And the FSMA provides for FDA 
licensing of food-processing facilities: the key licensing criterion is that the 
facility has an adequate Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Prevention Control 
plan.90 
All three statutes also mandate monitoring. The WIA requires that the 
Secretary of Labor “provide for the continuing evaluation” of the state 
programs.91 Both state and local plans must contain “performance 
accountability system[s]” in which the federal agency (in the case of the state 
plans) and the state board (in the case of the local ones) analyze data to 
determine that specified benchmarks have been met.92 Among the “indicators of 
performance” to be assessed are the entry rates of participants into 
employment, job retention six months from graduation, earnings six months 
from graduation, and the receipt of licenses and certifications that enhance 
employability. States and localities are expected to develop additional 
indicators.93 
The PREA creates a Review Panel on Prison Rape to collect data and 
produce an annual report.94 The panel must rank facilities by incidence of rape 
after adjusting for such factors as population size and prisoner characteristics.95 
The Act also requires a plan for internal staff monitoring, including video 
monitoring. Every prison must be audited at least every three years by an 
 
 88.  29 U.S.C. §§ 2822, 2833 (2012). 
 89.  28 C.F.R. 115 321–22.  
 90.  21 U.S.C. § 350(g). 
 91.  Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 112; 29 U.S.C. § 2822. 
 92.  Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 118; 29 U.S.C. § 2833. 
 93.  Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 136; 29 U.S.C. § 2871. WIA also has provisions 
characteristic of federal grant programs requiring financial audits of state programs and private service 
providers. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 §§ 159(b)(2), 184(a)(5); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2899(b)(2), 2934(a). 
 94.  Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4(b); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b) (2012).   
 95.  Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4(b)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b)(2)(A). 
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independent “correctional monitoring body.”96 
The FSMA prescribes that the FDA inspect licensed facilities and prioritize 
inspections on the basis of risk. At the facility level, it mandates that the 
“owner, operators, or manager shall monitor the effectiveness of [plan] 
controls.”97 The FDA is charged with developing “performance standards.”98 
All three statutes also require that plans must be regularly reassessed and 
revised. When WIA benchmarks are not met, service providers must develop 
“performance improvement plans.”99 Repeated failure to achieve targets 
requires changes in state or local plans.100 Under the PREA, facilities must, in 
connection with each investigation of indications of rape, consider whether the 
findings indicate a need for policy change. The FSMA requires that facilities 
that fail to achieve “zero tolerance” must periodically produce “corrective 
action” plans.101 All facilities must engage in “periodic reanalysis” of their plans 
to ensure that they are “still relevant to the raw materials, conditions, and 
processes in the facility, and new and emerging threats.”102 With respect to 
imported food, the statute prescribes that U.S. authorities establish a “foreign 
supplier verification program” by which exporters can get expedited processing 
if they have demonstrated the efficacy of their safety measures. A key 
consideration in this assessment is the adequacy of the foreign country’s food-
safety system.103 At the same time, the statute sets up processes for exchanging 
information and technical assistance between the United States and foreign 
regulators.104 Since some foreign nations will be seeking reassurance about U.S. 
efforts, the arrangements seem to contemplate a kind of peer review among 
regulators from different nations. 
Although the three regimes make use of complaint-initiated hearings,105 they 
also emphasize proactive forms of error detection. The monitoring provisions 
just mentioned are proactive. In addition, the FSMA and PREA emphasize the 
diagnostic use of specific error analysis. PREA requires that the Review Panel 
on Prison Rape conduct annual hearings focused on the three best performing 
 
 96.  Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4; 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b); 28 C.F.R. 115.401–04. 
 97.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 103(d); 30fg(d); 21 U.S.C. 2201. 
 98.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 104; 21 U.S.C. § 2201. 
 99. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 112(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 2871(b)(6). 
 100.  Workforce Investment Act of 1998 §§ 136(a)-(e); 172a; 29 U.S.C. §2871(a)-(e). 
 101.  28 C.F.R. 115.86, 115.93. 
 102.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 103(f)(5); 21 U.S.C. § 350g(f)(5). 
 103.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 301(c)(2), 303(b); 21 USC 384a(c)(2), 303b. 
 104.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 103(d),(e), (i); 21 U.S.C. § 350g(d), (e), (i). 
 105.  Workforce Investment Act of 1998 §§ 122(g), 181(c), 184(a), 186; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2842(g), 
2931(c), 2934 (providing for hearings for grantees faced with financial penalties and for disappointed 
applicants for some forms of assistance); Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 104 (providing for 
hearings for facilities faced with termination of registration). The PREA does not explicitly require 
hearings (as opposed to investigations) on inmate complaints, but all state provide grievance 
procedures that, in principle, adjudicate complaints of mistreatment. Margo Schlanger, Prison and Jail 
Grievance Policies, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/ 
PrisonGrievanceProceduresandSamples.aspx. 
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and three worst performing facilities in the year’s audit sample.106 The hearings 
will naturally tend to focus on the causes and remedies for low-performing 
institutions. FSMA requires that the FDA develop “surveillance systems” for 
foodborne illness that can respond quickly to evidence of contamination.107 The 
systems must have the capacity to “trace back” particular contaminated 
products through the supply chain to the source of the problem.108 As we have 
seen, problems discovered in inspections typically lead to a “corrective action 
plan.”109 
It is ambiguous how strongly proactive these measures are. They clearly 
require the systemic generalization and diagnostic use of monitoring data. 
However, it is often less clear how much the monitoring will involve the close 
analysis of specific incidents that defines strong proactive error detection. The 
one provision in these regimes that clearly requires strong proactive behavior is 
the requirement in the PREA regulations for sexual-abuse-incident reviews. 
When one of these required investigations either finds sexual abuse has 
occurred or proves inconclusive, a team that includes senior managers must 
determine “whether the allegation or investigation indicates a need to change 
policy or practice to better prevent, detect, or respond to sexual abuse.”110 The 
team is specifically directed to consider what the incident reveals about the 
adequacy of building configuration, monitoring technology, and staffing. 
There is no consensus on the efficacy of these three regimes. Appraisals of 
WIA are “mixed,”111 and PREA and the FSMA have only recently been 
implemented. However, with a few exceptions, criticisms of the program do not 
take issue with their rejection of the “compliance orientation” but rather 
suggest that the proactive, diagnostic approach has been insufficiently 
implemented.112 
 
 106.  Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4(b); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b); 28 C.F.R. 115.401- 405. 
 107.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 205(b); 21 U.S.C.§ 2224(b). 
 108.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 110(f); 21 U.S.C. § 2204(f). 
 109.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 102(b)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 374(b). 
 110.  Id. 28 C.F.R. 115.186.  
 111.  THE WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT: IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES AND EVALUATION 
FINDINGS 44 (Douglas Besharov & Phoebe H. Cottingham eds., 2011). See also Workforce Investment 
Act: Strategies Needed to Improve Certain Training Outcome Data, U.S. GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-137. 
 112.   For qualifiedly optimistic appraisal of PREA, see David Kaiser & Lovisa Stannow, Prison 
Rape: Obama’s Program to Stop It, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/prison-rape-obamas-stop-it; David Kaiser & 
Lovisa Stannow, Prison Rape and the Government, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 24, 2011, 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/mar/24/prison-rape-and-government. FSMA 
is still in the course of initial implementation, but a qualifiedly optimistic assessment of the Department 
of Agriculture’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point program for meat and poultry—in some 
respects a prototype for the FSMA regime—can be found in Committee on the Review of the Use of 
Scientific Criteria and Performance Standards for Safe Food, National Research Council, SCIENTIFIC 
CRITERIA TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD 133–75 (2003).  
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B. Executive Branch Initiatives 
Even without congressional prompting, executive-branch officials often act 
to impose discipline on administrative processes.113 Such initiatives have 
increasingly reflected performance-based principles. Some of them regulate 
administrative processes generally. We have noted that the most famous of 
these—Executive Order 12,866 requiring cost-benefit analysis—retains a 
bureaucratic flavor in its preoccupation with promulgation of regulations. 
However, one provision in this order has a distinctly performance-oriented 
tone: it mandates that regulations “to the extent feasible, specify performance 
objectives, rather than the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated 
entities must adopt.”114 President Obama’s directive on “open government and 
transparency” is also in the spirit of performance-based administration.115 
Performance-based principles are also salient in program-specific initiatives. 
Three examples are (1) the technical guide on “[a]daptive [m]anagement” of 
the Department of the Interior,116 (2) the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),117 and (3) the Voluntary Protection 
Program (VPP) of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA).118 
The adaptive management guide sets out recommendations for planning 
and implementation in situations within the Department’s responsibilities 
characterized by “uncertainty.” Such situations arise in the management of 
public forests and parks, the design and operation of irrigation and dam 
projects, habitat conservation under the Endangered Species Act, and the 
preparation of environmental impact statements under the National 
Environmental Policy Act. ROP and VPP concern inspection and enforcement 
practice. They set out processes through which firms can reduce some burdens 
of regulatory oversight by demonstrating the reliability of their safety practices. 
All three initiatives have only weak backward-looking legitimacy. They are 
 
 113.  See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Magill, supra 
note 32; JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285–316 (2012); Zaring, supra note 1.   
 114.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §601 app. at 86–
91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) 
 115.  Memorandum on the President’s Open Government Directive, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET (Dec. 8, 2009), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-government-
directive. For some of the fruits of this effort, see http://www.performance.gov (last visited Feb. 3, 
2015). 
 116.  U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT (rev. ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOI 
Guide]. 
 117.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1029, NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION: OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY HAS IMPROVED, BUT REFINEMENTS 
ARE NEEDED [hereinafter GAO NRC Report]; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Revision of NRC 
Enforcement Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 25368 (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter NRC Revision].   
 118.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-395, OSHA’S VOLUNTARY PROTECTION 
PROGRAMS: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS WOULD BETTER ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY 
[hereinafter GAO OSHA Report]; OSHA, VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PLAN POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURE MANUAL (April 18, 2008) [hereinafter VPP Manual].  
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not derived from specific statutory provisions. The Department of the Interior’s 
adaptive planning guide addresses circumstances where planning is mandated 
by statutes, but the guide’s directions about how to plan are not derived from 
any statute. The NRC and OSHA initiatives have some resemblance to the 
monitored self-regulatory approach of the Food Safety Modernization Act, but 
unlike the food safety statute, the nuclear and workplace safety statutes do not 
mention such self-regulatory activities. The NRC and OSHA provisions cite as 
authority only vague substantive provisions, such as OSHA’s mandate “to 
assure . . . safe and healthy working conditions,” and provisions giving the 
agency discretion to seek penalties, including OSHA’s authority to shut down 
plants it deems unsafe.119 A GAO report on the NRC regime notes that it 
operates largely independently of “regulatory requirements”—that is, statutory 
and administrative rules.120 In determining what demands to make on a facility, 
the agency takes account of conditions it deems dangerous even if they do not 
violate a rule. Conversely, a rule violation that does not affect safety is not 
counted for this purpose. In principle, only rule violations are subject to 
“enforcement actions” for civil and criminal penalties. On the other hand, any 
safety concern can affect “oversight.” Since “oversight” determines not only the 
amount of inspection and remediation, but whether the plant is permitted to 
operate, it is at least as potent as “enforcement.”121 
Although they prove weak on backward-looking accountability, the three 
initiatives strive for forward-looking accountability through guidance designed 
to make agency activity more intelligible, disclosure requirements, and periodic 
engagement with stakeholders.122 
The three regimes start with planning. With adaptive management, the 
agency invites a broad range of stakeholders to develop the plan. With the 
safety initiatives, the regulated firms develop their plans, and the agency 
reviews and certifies them. Monitoring is also a central theme. Adaptive 
management plans must specify “critical monitoring variables.”123 In the OSHA 
and NRC regimes, the regulators prescribe key indicators. Eligibility for 
reduced inspection under the VPP depends centrally on a firm’s total case 
incidence rate and its “[d]ays, [a]way, [r]estricted and/or [t]ransfer [r]ate” 
(measures of accidents and their effects on work processes) relative to industry 
norms.124 NRC tracks fifteen performance indicators. On the basis of these 
indicators, it ranks plants in four categories of risk. Higher risk classifications 
 
 119.  All About VPP, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/all_about_vpp.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
NRC Revision at 11–12. 
 120.   GAO NRC Report at 19.  
 121.  Id. at 21. 
 122.  DOI Guide at 23; GAO NRC Report, at 20–21, 28–29; GAO OSHA Report at 11. The 
transparency and participation themes are weaker in the OSHA initiative than the other two but still 
discernible. 
 123.  DOI Guide at 12–15.  
 124.  GAO OSHA Report at 3. 
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are inspected more frequently and intensely and demand more remedial efforts 
from operators. A key part of agency monitoring in the ROP and VPP is 
focused on facility self-monitoring. The agencies look to see not just whether 
there have been problems, but whether the regulated actors have themselves 
detected the problems.125 Problems should lead to reassessment of the plan, so 
the agencies also evaluate the facilities on their capacity to revise their plans in 
response to evidence of inadequacy.126 
Error detection in these regimes is proactive. Complaints do not play a 
prominent role in any of them. Aside from proactive monitoring, they 
sometimes take an ambitiously diagnostic approach to indications of problems. 
The adaptive management guide prescribes that the plan be based on a 
scientific model that includes predictions as to how the environment will 
respond to relevant interventions. The plan’s “critical monitoring variables” 
should be designed to test these predictions.127 The safety regimes prescribe 
both routine attention to designated indicators and “root cause analysis” of 
accidents or unexpected adverse events.128 
Assessments of the three regimes suggest that their efficacy varies. The 
GAO has evaluated the NRC’s ROP  as generally successful. It has evaluated 
OSHA’s VPP as seriously flawed, and critics have charged that some of the 
plans under the Department of the Interior’s adaptive planning approach have 
been unsatisfactory.129 Among GAO’s criticisms of OSHA are that it fails to 
reassess VPP eligibility regularly or even after accidents at certified firms and 
that it has failed to develop effective indices of the program’s effectiveness. A 
prominent criticism of adaptive management is that the adaptation idea is often 
used as an excuse for deferring even contingent resolution of key foreseeable 
issues. For example, water conservation plans may recite as goals the 
satisfaction of both environmental needs and agricultural demand, but these 
plans may also fail to specify what happens if and when either goal is not 
satisfied. 
Two points should be noted about such failings. First, they do not impugn 
the move to performance-based organization but simply the failure to execute it 
properly. Second, these failings suggest a potential role for administrative law. 
Canonical administrative law is largely indifferent to planning, monitoring, 
reassessment, and proactive error detection. The residual State Farm duty of 
reasonable consideration and explanation is consistently applied only in 
connection with rulemaking. However, were the canon to try to take account of 
performance-based organization, a logical step might be to extend judicial 
 
 125.  GAO NRC Report at 11 (“NRC bases its oversight process on the principle and requirement 
that licensees have programs in place to routinely identify and address performance issues without 
NRC’s direct involvement.”); DOI Guide at 33–34; VPP Manual at 21–36. 
 126.  GAO NRC Report at 3–4, 14; VPP Manual at 34; DOI Guide at 35–38. 
 127.  DOI Guide at 12. 
 128.  GAO NRC Report at 14; GAO OSHA Report at 16. 
 129.  GAO NRC Report at 14; Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 59, at 441. 
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intervention to failures of the kind the critics assert. The next subsection 
highlights how extreme instances of such failures sometimes lead to radical 
judicial intervention in the form of structural injunctions. However, there are 
often no judicial remedies for less extreme failures. A possible response would 
be to extend State Farm to hold that reasonable consideration and explanation 
often requires minimally adequate planning, monitoring, reassessment, and 
proactive error detection. 
C. Judicial Initiatives 
“[R]espondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by 
court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of 
Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made,”130 Justice 
Scalia wrote for the Court, denying relief in Lujan. In fact, there is an important 
category of cases in which courts entertain claims for wholesale improvement of 
public programs. In “public law” or “institutional-reform” litigation, the courts 
adjudicate claims of systemic official misconduct calling for relief involving 
administrative restructuring. Judicial decrees have reformed practices and 
processes of school systems, police departments, prisons, mental health 
institutions, child welfare systems, and other public agencies. Although this type 
of judicial practice remains controversial, it has proved durable and remains an 
important influence on many areas of government activity. In the Supreme 
Court’s latest encounter with public law litigation, it affirmed, 5–4, a decree 
radically altering California’s prison system, and only two of the dissenters—
Justices Scalia and Thomas—raised objections that challenged the general 
legitimacy of structural decrees.131 
These judicial interventions are intensely administrative. Sometimes they 
resolve substantive disagreements. But just as often, plaintiffs complain that the 
defendants are failing to respect substantive norms that all parties concede are 
binding. The judicial interventions tend to assume common patterns that are 
substantially independent of the particular substantive laws at stake and of 
whether the claims are statutory or constitutional.132 In effect, they constitute an 
implicit common law of administration that is triggered by a showing of 
systemic failures of performance and accountability with respect to important 
rights or benefits.133 In its most promising current configuration, this common 
law has little resemblance to canonical administrative law. Rulemaking and 
 
 130.  Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).  
 131.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1921 (2011). 
 132.  See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281 (1976); Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
626 (1981); Darryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 
(1999).  
 133.  Where the substantive claims are constitutional, the remedial jurisprudence could plausibly 
considered “constitutional common law”—terms derived from the constitution but not specifically 
mandated by it and subject to revision and experimentation. See Henry Monaghan, Constitutional 
Common Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889 (1976). 
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individual hearings play only peripheral roles in it. Norms are revised too 
frequently for notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the approach to error 
detection is more proactive and diagnostic than that of adjudicatory hearings.134 
Backward-looking legitimacy is hard to achieve in institutional-reform cases 
because the violation typically does not imply a unique remedy. Thus, critics 
charge that judges arbitrarily impose a particular administrative regime that 
usurps the authority of executive officials.135 This might be a plausible criticism 
of some decrees in the once-favored command-and-control style,136 but it is a 
mischaracterization of many decrees, and perhaps most recent ones. In the most 
promising recent cases, once liability is conceded or found by the court, the 
remedial regime is negotiated by the parties. The negotiated character of the 
relief does not make it consensual in any strong sense (even though the remedy 
is often called a “consent decree”). The court intervenes coercively. It forces the 
agency to engage with the plaintiffs both directly and indirectly—directly by 
ordering the agency to negotiate and indirectly by changing the balance of 
power. 
The balance of power is changed through a “penalty default”—the threat 
that the court will impose a harsher sanction than either party typically wants in 
the event that the parties fail to agree. The default sanction might be the closure 
of a facility, large fines, monetary sanctions against individual defendants, or 
the appointment of a receiver.137 It is a penalty default because, in most cases, it 
 
 134.  See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Foreword: Destabilization Rights: How Public 
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1062 (2004). 
 135.  Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 1953 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that structural decrees turn 
“judges into long-term administrators of complex social institutions”); accord ROSS SANDLER & 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN 
GOVERNMENT (2003).  
Whether systemic relief should be regarded as more intrusive than the individual relief the critics would 
prefer depends on, in addition to the character of the systemic relief, whether individual relief would 
actually be available to all affected individuals. Without systemic relief, individuals with valid claims 
might lack the material, informational, or psychological resources to pursue their claims effectively, but 
the resulting administrative autonomy could not plausibly be viewed as a normative baseline. On the 
other hand, if we assume aggrieved class members could obtain individual relief, there is no reason to 
think that a series of individual orders would be less burdensome to defendants. Indeed the prospect of 
multiple orders would probably induce defendants to seek consolidated proceedings that might 
resemble the ones to which the critics object on their behalf. 
 136.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (reversing a prison-reform decree that, among 
other things, specified what books had to be in the prison library). 
 137.  See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance, 
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 293–321 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott 
eds., 2006).  
 The prison population cap upheld in Plata combines features of a conventional 
remedy and a penalty default. It is conventional to the extent that it contributes more 
directly to the vindication of the relevant substantive rights to medical care than, say, a 
fine or official incarceration. On the other hand, it is a penalty default to the extent 
that its designers would have preferred that it induce negotiation of a more effective 
alternative rather than be specifically enforced. To the extent that it is a penalty 
default, Plata shows that specifically enforcing such penalties may sometimes be 
necessary when defendants persistently fail to perform. Even here, however, it is 
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does not represent the court’s estimate of the most appropriate intervention, 
but the court’s estimate of what will induce the parties to negotiate a better one. 
The court needs the parties to negotiate because they have better 
understanding of how to effectively change the institution and because some 
level of cooperation by the defendant will be needed to implement the 
intervention. Thus, legitimacy is substantially forward-looking. It depends on 
the capacity of the remedy to improve agency performance and increase 
accountability to the plaintiff class and the general public.138 
Three cases illustrate the tenor of second-generation public law 
remediation. The first is the San Joaquin River Restoration Program, created 
by a consent decree in a case brought by environmental groups against state and 
federal officials involved in diverting and controlling water in the San Joaquin 
River.  A central claim was that the defendants had harmed fish protected by 
the Endangered Species Act through excessive diversion for agricultural uses.139 
The second case is a challenge by racial minority group members and the 
American Civil Liberties Union to “stop-and-frisk” policing practices in the city 
of Philadelphia.140 The case asserted unconstitutional racial profiling.  And  the 
final case is a suit on behalf of children by the National Youth Law Center 
against the Utah agency responsible for protecting abused and neglected 
children.141 The critical claim was that the state systematically neglected its 
responsibility to provide reasonable care to children in its custody. 
The police and child welfare settlements incorporate measures widely 
regarded as “best practices” and employed in other jurisdictions voluntarily or 
by virtue of other judicial orders.142 The San Joaquin River decree is unusual in 
some respects, but its broad outlines resonate with the adaptive management 
 
misleading to characterize the court’s intervention as taking over management of the 
agency. As the majority pointed out, the order settles only one parameter, and the 
agency retains wide discretion how to comply with it.  
Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1941 (2011). 
 138.  The court has occasionally insisted on the backward-looking perspective, demanding that the 
remedy be derived more or less rigorously from the violation. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 
746 (1974) (remedy must be limited to undoing the “incremental segregative effect” of proven 
discrimination). But later cases ignore this demand, perhaps because it is hard to translate into practice 
and potentially more disruptive than other approaches. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 134, at 1082–90. 
 139.  Notice of Lodgment of Stipulation of Settlement, Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, Case No. 
S-88-1658-LKK/GGH, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2006) [hereinafter San Joaquin Notice]. Information on the 
program and its implementation can be found at www.restoresjr.net. The settlement was conditioned 
on federal and state funding that required legislative approval, which was in fact forthcoming. San 
Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 1001-10203; California Propositions 
13, 84 (2006). 
 140.  Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of 
Philadelphia, C.A. 10-5952. (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) [hereinafter Philadelphia Agreement]. 
 141.  David C. v. Leavitt, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Utah 1998); Utah Department of Child and 
Family Services, The Milestone Plan (May 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Utah Milestone 
Plan].. 
 142.  Walker, supra note 79; Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel, & William H. Simon, Legal 
Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 523 (2009).  
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procedures recommended in the Department of the Interior guide and 
commonly found in environmental restoration regimes.143 The Utah child 
protective services case is the oldest. It was concluded in 2007, fifteen years 
after it was filed, when the parties stipulated that the remedial reforms had been 
successfully implemented. The other two regimes are still under construction. 
Of the three decrees, only the River Restoration case purports to settle 
important substantive issues and contains extensive direction of primary 
conduct. There, the decree obligates the defendants to construct extensive 
physical improvements, such as bypass channels and fish ladders. It also sets out 
detailed standards for the operation of a large dam and other facilities to ensure 
minimum flows of water for fish and other species. Nevertheless, the decree 
contemplates that many issues will be worked out in the course of 
implementation. 
The Philadelphia and Utah decrees contain virtually no substantive 
provisions other than recitations of general uncontested propositions (for 
instance, that police stops require “reasonable suspicion” or that the Utah 
agency is obliged “to provide for the protection, permanence and well-being of 
children and families in Utah”).144 The San Joaquin decree, in part, and virtually 
the entirety of the other two are concerned with establishing processes that will 
provide for coherent and transparent implementation and continuously 
elaborating standards to address new issues in ways that give assurance to the 
plaintiffs that their views and interests will be considered. The decrees are thus 
centrally concerned with plans, monitoring, and reassessment.145 
The San Joaquin decree contains an overall plan for the restoration of the 
river. It also contemplates the development by the parties of future plans for 
such tasks as the reintroduction of salmon and the recirculation of water.146 The 
Philadelphia decree requires the defendant to review all of its “training, 
supervision, and discipline policies” and to make appropriate changes after 
consultation with the plaintiffs.147 The Utah decree incorporates an extensive 
“Milestone Plan” the parties developed that regulates client services 
 
 143.  E.g., Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 255 F. 3d 342 (7th Cir. 
2001); Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 59. 
 144.  Philadelphia Agreement, supra note 140, at Part II (D); Utah Milestone Plan, supra note 141, 
at 5. 
 145.  The San Joaquin decree has a connection to canonical doctrine, since it was styled as a 
challenge under APA sections 702-06 to action “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.” Where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a federal statute that does 
not provide a specific private right of action, plaintiffs typically appeal to the APA as support for 
reviewability. But very little in doctrine elaborating the APA explains or supports the complex, 
performance-based remedy in the case. By contrast, the remedy has much in common with remedies in 
institutional-reform cases brought under noncanonical authority, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 1983 
(authorizing suits against state officers acting under color of law for violations of federal rights) or 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (finding an implied right of action 
against federal officials for violations of the bill of rights). The Philadelphia police case and the Utah 
child protective services cases were brought under section 1983. 
 146.  San Joaquin Notice ¶¶14, 16, 17-19, Exhibit D. 
 147.  Philadelphia Agreement 2(D). 
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comprehensively. The plan sets out a distinctive vision of social service 
administration. The center of the vision is an individualized case plan for each 
child constructed by an interdisciplinary professional team with family members 
and caretakers.148 
All three decrees provide for monitors (called in the San Joaquin case 
“Restoration Administrator”) chosen by the parties jointly. The monitor’s role 
is to assemble and report information and to make recommendations to the 
defendants. There is an implicit (or in the San Joaquin case, explicit) duty on 
the part of the defendants to explain departures from the monitor’s 
recommendations. 
The San Joaquin decree specifies the six points on the river where flows will 
be measured, and more generally requires the development of guidelines for 
the measurement and reporting of releases.149 The Philadelphia decree requires 
the city to review its reporting protocols for stops, in consultation with the 
plaintiffs, so that data needed to assess racial bias is included. The city is 
required to record the reports electronically in a searchable form and then to 
produce monthly reports for the plaintiffs. Philadelphia must also institute 
periodic audits by supervisors of a sample of specific incidents, periodic 
“department wide audits and assessments” of the policies, and “triggering 
thresholds for retraining, enhanced supervision, or discipline of officers.”150 
About half of the ninety-one single-spaced pages of the Utah plan are devoted 
to monitoring. It specifies a range of indicators to be measured and reported 
and a series of “accountability structures” involving monitoring by both insiders 
and outsiders. At the casework level, among the key skills taught to workers 
and assessed in evaluations is “tracking” the circumstances of the child.151 
Each of the decrees contemplates reassessment of norms and practices as 
part of the normal operation of the decree. The San Joaquin agreement is the 
only one that seeks to immunize some provisions—those that limit the amount 
of reductions to be imposed on farmers—from reassessment for an extended 
period (until 2025). But it contemplates that the monitor and the advisory 
committee will make recommendations on a host of other issues in response to 
monitoring data.152 Philadelphia and the plaintiffs agreed that each would 
“review [monitoring] data and documentation under agreed upon benchmarks 
for measuring compliance” with applicable standards and submit reports and 
recommendations every six months to the monitor and the court.153 
The Utah plan is the most insistent about the centrality of reassessment. All 
of its many monitoring processes are described as mechanisms to support 
transparency and reassessment. The key focus, it insists, is on the “self-
 
 148.  Utah Milestone Plan at 5–21.  
 149.  San Joaquin Notice 13(g),(j). 
 150.  Philadelphia Agreement II(C), (G); IV(c). 
 151.  Utah Milestone Plan at 60–91; Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 142, at 536–40. 
 152.  San Joaquin Agreement ¶¶ 14, 16, 20.  
 153.  Philadelphia Agreement IV(D). 
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correcting, continuous quality improvement.” It continues, “The plan and the 
approach to monitoring make the performance feedback process more organic 
and developmental than deficiency finding [i.e., compliance assessment] alone.” 
To coordinate re-assessment, the plan establishes regional Quality 
Improvement Committees “to study the data and outcomes children, families, 
and communities experience, and to suggest changes in resource deployment, 
policy, procedure, and practice.”154 
Institutional-reform remedies make use of the kind of proactive error 
detection that treats individual cases diagnostically. Viewed as a whole, the 
institutional-reform suit itself often exemplifies such error detection. When 
liability is contested, a central part of the plaintiffs’ evidence usually explores a 
series of individual instances of violations. The plaintiffs argue that the court 
can infer from statistical evidence or evidence of general structure and practice 
that the individual cases are exemplary of more general phenomena and can 
make inferences from the cases about specific causes and effects of the systemic 
problems.155 
These three examples differ in the extent that they are ambitiously proactive 
within the remedial structures. The San Joaquin decree does not mention error 
detection, although some forms of it might be appropriate, such as the 
diagnostic incident or “significant operating event” reviews performed in 
medicine and “high reliability” systems like aviation.156 The Philadelphia police 
decree requires review of records of specific stops but it is unclear whether it 
contemplates aggregate “checklist”-type compliance analysis, on the one hand, 
or the close diagnostic analysis associated with the ambitious form of error 
detection on the other. Of course, the Philadelphia decree is part of a larger 
structure that includes both an administrative complaint process and lawsuits 
for damages. These processes could be used diagnostically, and in some 
regimes, they are.157 
The Utah child protective services decree is notable in its attempt to 
combine rich exploration of individual incidents with systemic reassessment. 
The centerpiece of the regime is a Quality Case Review (QCR). The process 
begins with pulling a stratified random sample of cases. The cases are then 
intensively reviewed through both examinations of documents and interviews 
with the professionals, caregivers, and beneficiaries. The reviewers work in two-
 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  E.g., Floyd v. City of New York, Opinion and Order, 08 Civ. 1034 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 12, 2013) 
(combining detailed analysis of individual complaints with assessment of testimony on “institutional 
practices” and statistics to conclude that the city’s “stop-and-frisk” practices are unconstitutional).  
 156.  See sources cited supra notes 23–24.  
 157.  For example, in a few cities, an independent board or agency “reviews complaints [against 
police officers] for the purpose of both identifying problems with the complaint review process and also 
of identifying the underlying causes of complaints and recommending the appropriate corrective 
action.” Walker, supra note 79, at 25. Some cities integrate analysis of lawsuits into their “early warning 
systems” designed to identify officers who should be disciplined or subjected to greater supervision 
(though a larger number do not). See generally Joanna Schwartz, What the Police Learn from Lawsuits, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (2012).  
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person teams, typically one from the state program office and the other an 
outsider from an NGO, university, or another state program. They spend two 
full days on each case. They score the case in terms of sets of metrics designed 
to assess both fidelity to established policy and the efficacy of the intervention. 
The criteria are qualitative. The system strives for consistency by demanding 
consensus within the team and by having teams meet with each other to discuss 
difficult judgments. Once the scores are set, each team meets with the case 
workers and their supervisors to discuss possible improvements in the handling 
of the case. Then review teams meet in larger groups with workers and 
administrators to discuss possible systemic reforms indicated by the reviews. 
The case scores are aggregated for the division as a whole and used as measures 
of overall performance. The idea of combing rich exploration of particular 
circumstance with diagnostic appraisal is expressed by one of the process’ 
designers in the motto, “Every case is a unique and valid test of the system.”158 
In 2007, the plaintiffs and agency agreed that the Utah system was 
performing at a level that warranted termination of judicial supervision. In 
agreeing to termination, the plaintiffs relied on aggregate QCR scores and on 
the agency’s commitment to continue the process. In the same year, an 
Alabama federal court decided to terminate judicial supervision of the 
Alabama child protective services regime, relying centrally on the same 
qualitative review process (designed in part by some of the same consultants 
involved in the Utah decree). In this case, the plaintiffs opposed termination, 
and there were disputes about the interpretation of its results. The court 
adopted the agency’s interpretation, but in doing so, it treated the QCR process 
as both a central indication of the agency’s level of performance and a basic 
safeguard of “substantial compliance.”159 
The claims in the Alabama case were both constitutional and statutory. 
Moreover, there were specific statutory procedures applicable to the program. 
The court, however, made little effort to distinguish constitutional from 
statutory requirements, and it largely ignored the statutory procedural 
provisions, instead focusing on the QCR, which had no statutory mandate. 
Thus, the court’s ruling might be understood as part of a common law of 
responsible administration that entails duties to plan, monitor, and reassess. To 
be sure, the court did not use these terms, probably because appellate doctrine 
under section 1983 often purports to predicate liability on the state of mind of 
senior managers. Cases tend to speak of mismanagement not as a breach of 
duty in itself, but as evidence of illicit managerial intent.160 This intent seems 
largely a fiction that functions only to link practice to a conception of public 
duty that predates the administrative state. In this conception, government is 
constituted by individual officers rather than institutions. Explicitly recognizing 
duties to administer responsibly would fit better with much current practice and 
 
 158.  Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 142, at 542–49.  
 159.  Id. at 1134–39, 1177–80. 
 160.  E.g., Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011).  
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might provide a more compelling justification for it.161 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The preoccupation of the canon with judicial control of administrative 
action now seems anachronistic and parochial. As scholarship and teaching 
increasingly acknowledge, many of the most important legal determinants of 
administrative action arise from (1) legislative action via statutes other than the 
APA, (2) executive initiatives only tenuously connected to rulemaking and 
adjudication, and (3) judicial practice in institutional-reform cases. These 
initiatives tend to have a structure quite different from that of the canonical 
doctrine. The differences in structure reflect differences in organizational 
premises. The canonical doctrine tends to presuppose bureaucratic 
organization. The noncanonical doctrine often arises from performance-based 
organization. Updating the canon thus requires broadening its focus. 
It also requires reconsideration of the canonical approach to the issue with 
which the canon has been most concerned—judicial review of discrete 
administrative action. As Edward Rubin says, the APA needs redrafting.162 But 
significant reorientation could occur without new legislation. Most of the 
canonical doctrine reviewed here arises from judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution and the general clauses of the APA (notably the “arbitrary, 
capricious” standard163) and a half-acknowledged exercise of common law 
powers. The argument above supports suggestions for reorientation along three 
broad lines. 
First, judicial doctrine should be more attentive to oversight 
accountability.164 It is not controversial that courts should enforce legislative 
decisions where there are legislative decisions to enforce. However, 
contemporary legislation increasingly addresses situations where neither the 
dimensions of the problems nor their solutions can be known in advance of 
intervention. Legislation thus becomes procedural and involves fewer decisions 
of the kind that generate substantive “law to apply.” Courts should not try to 
squeeze determinate guidance out of texts that do not reflect any determinate 
understanding. At the same time, they should be more willing in situations of 
statutory ambiguity to intervene to require measures that reinforce political 
accountability. Chevron suggests the right sequence—consider whether the 
statute gives the agency discretion, and then, whether the agency has acted 
 
 161.  See Gillian Metzger, The Constitutional Status of Administration and the Duty to Supervise 124 
YALE L. J. (forthcoming). 
 162.  Rubin, supra note 26, at 189. See also Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Ruhl, Designing 
Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014) (proposing statutory changes 
to accommodate adaptive management). 
 163.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 164.  See Sidney Shapiro, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking inside the Agency for 
Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 465 (2012) (arguing for more attention to “inside-out” 
legitimacy rather than “outside-in” legitimacy). 
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reasonably. But the latter step should be less interpretive and more procedural. 
It bears on reasonableness whether the agency has acted coherently, 
reflectively, and transparently.165 
Second, doctrine should be less intensely focused on rulemaking and less 
deferential to non-rule-governed activity (in APA-speak, to informal 
adjudication). The burden of rule-focused review should be lessened, perhaps 
by eliminating pre-enforcement review or by more deference to procedurally 
adequate decisions.166 At the same time, the courts should not leave non-rule-
governed administration immune from “arbitrary-and-capricious” review. 
Recent judicial practice in structural reform cases shows that courts can 
intervene to enforce accountability without dictating the substantive terms of 
administrative practice. It also shows that courts can explicitly take into account 
the level of administrative dysfunction in deciding when intervention is 
appropriate. Canonical doctrine purports to rely on categorical indicators as to 
when intervention is appropriate. Structural reform doctrine, more plausibly, 
often insists on a showing of major dysfunction. 
Third, appropriate error-detection efforts should not be framed exclusively 
in terms of duties of individual fairness to complainants. Responsible 
administration requires proactive efforts to identify and remedy errors, and it 
often also requires a diagnostic approach to error that seeks the systemic 
implications of particular problems.167 
 
 
 165.  Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Lisa Bressman, Judicial 
Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1690–92 (2004). 
 166.  See Mashaw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 30, at 106–81 (opposing pre-
enforcement review); Peter Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over 
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992) (arguing for more 
deference). 
 167.  See Mashaw, Management Side of Due Process, supra note 77; Cuellar, supra note 38. 
